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LABOR LAW-AcCESS TO BULLETIN BOARDS- Teamsters, Local 
515 (Roadway Express), 248 N.L.R.B. 83 (1980), enforcement denied 
sub nom., Helton v. NLRB, 656 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 7 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, (the Act)l 
provides that 
[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, 
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre­
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual 
aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any 
or all of such activities.2 
The Supreme Court has implied that the employees' right of ac.cess 
to bulletin boards in the work place is encompassed by section 7.3 A 
violation of an employee's rights under this section may be an unfair 
labor practice.4 All unfair labor practices are defined in section 8 of 
the Act.s 
l. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). 
2. Id The Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, 29 U.S.c. 
§§ 141-197 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), was a response to the powerful position labor unions 
had attained under the original National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935. Na­
tional Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.c. 
§§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. V 1981». The Taft-Hartley Act made numerous changes in 
the Wagner Act, including the inclusion of the clause in section 7 granting employees the 
right to refrain from union activities listed in that section. The addition of the aforemen­
tioned clause in section 7 placed the right of employees to refrain from union activities 
on equal footing with the right to affirmatively encourage union organization. The Taft­
Hartley amendments also added unfair labor practice provisions for unions paralleling 
those of employer provisions. See infra note 5. 
3. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 563-70 (1978); see also NLRB v. Proof 
Co., 242 F.2d 560, 562 (7th Cir.) (holding that a bulletin board is a working condition), 
cerl. denied, 355 U.S. 831 (1957). 
4. An unfair labor practice has been defined as "a statutory 'wrong. . . [which] is 
not a crime' [but] is more closely akin to a common-law tort [in that] it amounts to an 
invasion of a publicly declared right." 2 LAB. L. REp. (CCH) ~ 2230. An unfair labor 
practice under the Labor-Management Relations Act (the Act) may be prosecuted only 
by the agency created by the Act, the NLRB and the NLRB's General Counsel. Id 
5. 29 U.S.c. § 158 (1976). There are two statutory sources of unfair labor prac­
tices: acts of an employer, found in sections 8(a) & (e) of the Act, and acts of labOr 
organizations, found in sections 8(b) & (e) of the Act. This note will focus only on those 
unfair labor practices falling under section 8(a)(I) and section 8(b)(1)(A). Section 8(a)(1) 
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Questions involving the right of access to bulletin boards have 
previously arisen under section 8(a)(l) in the context of unfair labor 
practices by employers.6 The issue of employee access to a union 
bulletin board, however, had not previously been decided by the Na­
tional Labor Relations Board (the Board).7 Teamsters, Local 515 
(Roadway Express)8 presented this issue to the Board and subse­
quently on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis­
trict of Columbia in Helton v. NLRB.9 The Board determined that a 
union could prevent an employee's access to a union bulletin 
board.lO The court of appeals in Helton disagreed and stated that 
the union had violated the employee's rights under the Act by deny­
ing access to the union bulletin board. II 
This note will focus on the proper interpretation of section 
8(b)(l)(A) and the section's application to the facts in Helton in rela­
tion to case law that has evolved regarding employee distribution of 
literature on workplace bulletin boards. This note will analyze the 
statute, its legislative history, and case law to determine whether 
there should be a double standard governing union and employer 
obligations at law under the unfair labor practice sections of the Act. 
Additionally, this note will determine whether the court of appeals 
expanded section 8(b)(l)(A) by finding an unfair labor practice on 
the part of the union when no physical restraint was present. 12 
of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(I) (1976), provides that "[ilt shall be an unfair labor prac­
tice for an employer (I) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of 
the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title." Id. Section 8(b)(I)(A) of the Act, 29 
U.S.c. § 158(b)(I)(A) (1976), provides that 
[ilt shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents (I) to 
restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Sec­
tion 157 of this title: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of 
a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or 
retention of membership therein. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
6. See infra notes 130-50 and accompanying text. 
7. Although cases arose and charges were filed, they were later withdrawn. See 
Roadway Express, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 653, 653 (1978) (employee filed an unfair labor 
practice charge against union for removal of Professional Drivers' Council (PROD) liter­
ature from bulletin board, then subsequently withdrew the charge). For a brief explana­
tion of PROD, see infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. 
8. 248 N.L.R.B. 83, enforcement denied suh nom., Helton v. NLRB, 656 F.2d 883 
(D.c. Cir. 1981). 
9. 656 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
10. 248 N.L.R.B. at 83. See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text for an expla­
nation of the board's holding. 
II. 656 F.2d at 897. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text for the holding 
of the court of appeals. 
12. While the author recognizes that there are other valid issues involved in this 
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II. CASE BACKGROUND 
Teamsters Local 515, a labor organization, represented the em­
ployees of Roadway Express Company at its Chattanooga, Tennes­
see, terminal. 13 Article 19, section 2 of the collective bargaining 
agreement between Roadway and the union provided that the em­
ployer would provide space for a union bulletin board but that post­
ings on the board would be confined to official union business. 14 
Roadway provided three separate bulletin boards in the employee 
breakroom: One was used exclusively by the company; another, 
known as the "sick fund board," was used by the company, union, 
and employees, and; the third was used primarily by the union for 
posting official notices to employees. 15 The third bulletin board also 
had been used for ten years by employees and nonemployees for 
posting all types of personal, political, and social notices. Prior to 
the incident in this case, the restrictions on the use of this bulletin 
board were not enforced as the collective bargaining agreement 
provided. 16 
Helton, an employee of Roadway Express, Inc., was a member 
of Teamsters Local 515. In late 1978, he joined the Professional 
Drivers' Council (PROD), an organization of rank and file Team­
sters l7 existing chiefly to achieve reformation of the Teamsters 
Union. IS 
On December 14, 1978, Helton posted on the union's bulletin 
board a PROD editorial and a newspaper article critical of the 
union. 19 The union job steward removed Helton's materials from 
controversy, such as the applicability of the internal affairs proviso of section 8(b)(1)(A), 
the free speech rights guaranteed by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure 
Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415 (1976) 
(LMRDA», the duty of fair representation, and the relevancy of alternative methods of 
communication, an indepth discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this note. 
13. 656 F.2d at 884. 
14. Id. The provision provided: ''The Employer agrees to provide suitable space 
for the union bulletin board in each garage, terminal or place of work. Postings by the 
union on such boards are to be confined to official business of the union." Id. (quoting 
Art. 19, § 2 of the collective bargaining agreement). 
IS. 656 F.2d at 884-85. 
16. Id. at 884. 
17. Membership in the Teamsters Union is a prerequisite to joining PROD. Id. at 
885. 
18. Id. PROD seeks to promote truck safety and expose union corruption and pen­
sion fund abuses. PROD also serves as a vehicle for employee expression of concerns 
over their conditions of employment. Id. For a brief history of PROD and its focus and 
concerns. See S. BRILL, THE TEAMSTERS 312-20 (1978). 
19. 656 F.2d at 885. The newspaper article described I.R.S. charges against a Las 
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the board.20 Several weeks later, Helton again posted PROD mate­
rial 011 the union bulletin board and again the job steward removed 
it,21 The union took no action against Helton.22 Shortly thereafter, 
the bulletin boards were removed so that the breakroom could be 
painted.23 When the boards were replaced, only the employer's bul­
letin board and the union's bulletin board were retumed.24 The 
uniop. bulletin board was placed behind locked glass.2s When 
Helton asked union officials for permission to post PROD material 
on the union board, they refused to grant it. The union did, how­
ever, continue to allow the board to be used by other employees for 
non-union business and for personal notices.26 
On February 6, 1979, Helton filed an unfair labor practice 
charge with the NLRB under section 8(b)(1)(A)27 against Teamsters 
Local 515.28 A complaint was issued by the General Council and in 
June, 1979, a hearing was held before an administrative law judge.29 
The administrative law judge ruled that because Helton's activity 
was protected by section 7,30 the union had committed an unfair la­
bor practice under section 8(b)(1)(A).31 The administrative law 
Vegas gambler to whom the Teamsters' pension fund had loaned large sums of money; 
the PROD editorial was critical of the Teamsters' pension fund management. fd 
20. fd Business agent Perkins testified that he felt he should not permit the PROD 
material to be posted because "it was derogatory, it was adverse toward our local union 
and the Teamsters in general. And, I felt it shouldn't be there because it created contro­





25. fd The employer's bulletin board was also placed behind locked glass. Id 
26. fd This fact is significant in that it indicates that the union discriminated 
against Helton in its posting policy. See infra notes 141-50 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the implications of discriminatory posting policy. 
27. See supra note 5. 
28. 248 N.L.R.B. at 84. 
29. fd 
30. fd at 86. An employee's membership in PROD as well as his activities on 
behalf of PROD, including the posting of PROD literature on the bulletin board in the 
workplace, are protected by section 7 of the Act. fd See Roadway Express, Inc., 239 
N.L.R.B. 653 (1978); Transcon Lines, 235 N.L.R.B. 1163 (1978), enforced, 599 F.2d 719 
(5th Cir. 1979). Cf. NLRB v. Nu-Car Carriers, Inc., 189 F.2d 756 (3rd Cir. 1951) (drivers 
were not members of PROD), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952). 
Helton's act of posting the PROD notices and inviting his fellow employees to join 
him in union activities constitutes protected concerted activity. See Republic Aviation 
Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); see also NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.s. 322 
(1974). 
31. 248 N.L.R.B. at 87. Under these same facts, an employer would be held to 
have committed an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1), so the union should be 
held to the same standard. fd at 86. 
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judge reasoned that the case fit under the Board's prior case law 
dealing with discriminatory application of a valid no-solicitation 
rule.32 
The union bulletin board had originally been established 
strictly for the union's official use.33 The administrative law judge, 
however, stated that since the union had permitted the bulletin 
board to be used freely by employees for general purposes, it could 
not now prohibit the use of that board for the posting of literature 
critical of the union.34 The administrative law judge found it imma­
terial that the employees were able to disseminate the PROD litera­
ture to employees by other means and the union's contention that 
employees would mistake the PROD material for official Teamster's 
material was held to be without merit.35 The administrative law 
judge further noted that the controversial nature36 of the material 
did not cause it to forfeit its statutory protection:37 "There can be no 
restriction upon employees when they begin to question the quality 
32. Id. The administrative law judge relied primarily on NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 
415 U.S. 322 (1974). In Magnavox, the Supreme Court held that a union's contractual 
waiver of objection to the employer's rule against distribution of literature on company 
property interfered with the employee's rights under section 7 of the Act and that the 
union cannot validly waive those rights. Id. at 324-26. The Court reasoned that because 
the concept of allowing the union to waive an employee's statutory rights presupposes 
that the selection of the bargaining representative remains free, employees supporting the 
union and those in opposition to it must be equally secure in their rights under the Act. 
See id. at 325-26. Note, however, that statutory rights that are not waivable are a rarity, 
and are confined mainly to selection of a bargaining representative. The Board has 
found that a bargaining representative may waive various rights guaranteed to employ­
ees by the Act. See Shell Oil Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1948) (the right to strike); Tide 
Water Associated Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949) (the right to bargain over pension 
plans); Shell Oil Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 161 (1951) (the right to handle grievances). The poli­
cies of the Act, however, may not be thwarted by contractual agreement. See C. MORRIS, 
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW (1971). 
33. 656 F.2d at 884. 
34. 248 N.L.R.B. at 86. The administrative law judge stated that had the use of the 
bulletin board previously been confined strictly to official business of the union, there 
would have been no violation. Id. See infra notes 47-49. 
35. 248 N.L.R.B. at 86. Even though the material did not state explicitly that it 
was published by PROD, the administrative law judge reasoned that a reading of the 
literature would disclose its authorship. Id. The newsletter was entitled Prod Dispatch 
and thus its authorship was clear. Id. at 85. 
36. The administrative law judge characterized the literature as extremely critical 
of the Teamsters and its leaders. Id. at 85. 
37. Id. The material "was not so ofi"ensiv,e, flagrant, violent, or extreme as to 
render it unprotected." Id. at 86. See Container Corp. of America, 244 N.L.R.B. 318 
(1979), enforced in part, enforcement denied in part, 649 F .2d 1213 (6th Cir. 1981); Timpte, 
Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1977), enforcement denied, 590 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1979); Dreis 
& Krump Mfg., 221 N.L.R.B. 309 (1975), enforced, 544 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1976); see also 
infra note 144 for a discussion of the test used to determine when union-related material 
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of their representation. . ."38 and that the union could not now re­
strict the use of the bulletin board simply because the material 
posted on it was critical of the union.39 
The union filed exceptions to the administrative law judge's de­
cision in September, 1979. A three-member panel of the NLRB re­
versed the administrative law judge by a vote of two-to-one.40 The 
majority did not overturn any of the findings of fact but held instead 
that a union could lawfully remove dissident members' materials 
from a union-controlled bulletin board.41 The Board distinguished 
sections 8(a)(1) and 8(b)(1)(A) and ruled that despite their similarity, 
unions should not be held to be the same standard of conduct as 
employers.42 The Board found no "restraint or coercion" in the 
union's conduct toward Helton.43 The Board's view was that re­
straint or coercion was a prerequisite to finding an unfair labor prac­
tice under section 8(b)(1)(A), and though mere interference would be 
enough under section 8(a)(1), it was insufficient under section 
8(b)(1)(A).44 Thus, the case was dismissed. 
Dissenting Member Jenkins maintained that the union's con­
duct toward Helton constituted an unlawful restriction upon em­
ployees during a period in which the employees began to question 
the quality of their representation.45 Jenkins cited NLRB v. 
being distributed by an employee loses its statutory protection because of its controver­
sial nature. 
38. 248 N.L.R.B. at 86. The administrative law judge stated that the union's con­
tention that the literature could lead to altercations between parties is mere conjecture 
and without any evidentiary support. Id But see supra note 20. 
39. 248 N.L.R.B. at 86. 
40. Id at 84. (Chairman Fanning and Member Penello in the majority, Member 
Jenkins dissenting). 
41. Id at 83. The majority found merit in the union's contentions that it had never 
allowed its bulletin board to be used for anti-union messages; that to require the union to 
allow posting of critical notices about the union would be patently unfair; that the mate­
rial could be freely distributed elsewhere; and that no disciplinary action had been taken 
by the union against Helton. Id 
42. Id The majority stated that the cases relied upon by the administrative law 
judge differed critically from the case at hand in that the former involved employer ac­
tion whereas the latter involved union action; therefore, a different section of the Act 
governs. Id See supra note 5. But, the Board did concede that under section 8(a)(I) an 
employer may not prohibit employees from posting union materials on its bulletin board 
when it allows them to use the board for other purposes. 248 N.L.R.B. at 83. 
43. 248 N.L.R.B. at 83. The Board held that the union's actions in this case were 
"devoid of any implications of retribution" and hence were not "restraining or coercing." 
Id 
44. Id 
45. Id at 84 (Member Jenkins, dissenting). 
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Magnavox Co. 46 as controlling because it also involved an improper 
balancing of interests in the application of section 7 rights similar to 
that which occurred in Roadway Express.47 Jenkins stated that the 
union curtailed Helton's freedom of expression when it refused to 
allow him to post PROD materia1.48 He maintained that there must 
be equitable dissemination of employee views in the workplace; and 
reasoned that ''while a union may waive the right to distribute its 
own institutional literature, it cannot waive or preclude the employ­
ees' rights to disseminate [sic] literature pertaining to their union 
views."49 
Helton sought review of the Board's decision in Roadway Ex­
press. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that 
section 8(b)(1)(A) applied to the union conduct at issue and held that 
the union conduct violated Helton's section 7 rights.50 The court 
held that the NLRB's narrow interpretation of section 8(b)(1 )(A) was 
inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute, its legislative his­
tory, and was not supported conclusively by Supreme Court deci­
sions or the Board's own precedent.51 
The court of appeals also held that the internal affairs proviso of 
section 8(b)(I)(A)52 was inapplicable. 53 The court noted that while 
the proviso extended limited protection to union conduct that might 
otherwise violate the exercise of section 7 rights, it did not insulate 
the conduct at issue in this case. 54 
46. 415 u.s. 322 (1974). See supra note 32. 
47. 248 N.L.R.B. at 84 (Member Jenkins, dissenting). In Magnavox Co., the 
Supreme Court held that "a limitation of the right of in-plant distribution of literature to 
employees opposing the union does not give a fair balance to § 7 rights. . . . Employees 
supporting the union have as secure § 7 rights as those in opposition." 415 U.S. at 326. 
The Court continued, "[i)t is the Board's function to strike a balance among 'conflicting 
legitimate interests' which will 'effectuate national labor policy', including those who 
support versus those who oppose the union." Id (emphasis in original) (quoting NLRB 
v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957». 
Jenkins did not feel that Helton's section 7 rights had to be balanced against any 
right of the union to restrict posting on its bulletin board only to those views that were 
favorable toward the union. 248 N.L.R.B. at 84 (Member Jenkins, dissenting). 
48. 248 N.L.R.B. at 84. 
49. Id 
50. 656 F.2d at 887-86. 
51. Id 
52. See supra note 5. 
53. 656 F.2d at 893-94. 
54. Id The court held that the union action in Hellon was not protected by the 
proviso of section 8(b)(I)(A) because it did not meet the three-prong test set forth in 
Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969). 656 F.2d at 893-96. The proviso addresses union 
discipline of members who violate internal rules and regulations governing union mem­
bership. Id at 893. To be protected under the proviso, an intemalunion rule must: 
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The court of appeals, agreeing with the administrative law 
judge and Board dissent, held that the availability of alternative 
means of communication was immaterial and irrelevant.55 While 
initially noting that it was not clear whether Helton actually did have 
access to equally effective means of distribution,56 the court further 
noted that even if Helton did have alternative channels, that fact did 
not justify the union's restraint of his section 7 rights.57 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Statutory Interpretation 
The Supreme Court has held that the interpretation of a statute, 
particularly in the area of labor legislation, requires that one ex­
amine the plain meaning of the statute and the language in which it 
is framed.58 
The statutory provisions in sections 8(b)(I)(A) and 8(a)(I)59 
contain the words "interfere with," "restrain," and "coerce."60 The 
ruling of the Board hinged on the absence of the words "interfere 
with" from the list of unfair labor practices under section 
(1) reflect a legitimate union interest; (2) impair no policy Congress has imbedded in the 
labor laws; and (3) be reasonably enforced against the union members who are free to 
leave the union and escape the rule. Id at 894 (quoting 394 U.S. at 430). For a full 
discussion of the applicability of the internal affairs proviso and the Scofield tests see 656 
F.2d at 893-96. The court noted that even if the internal affairs proviso protected the 
conduct at issue here, it could not affirm because the Board did not rely on the proviso in 
its decision. Id at 893 n.52. 
55. 656 F.2d at 896-97. 
56. Id at 896. Helton was not permitted to use the company board and the sick 
board was no longer available. Id The court maintained that leaving the material on 
tables in the breakroom was not an effective alternative because the company custodians 
or the union itself could easily have removed it. Id 
57. Id at 896-97. The court noted that "[tJhe NLRB has consistently ruled that the 
presence of alternative methods of communication is not relevant in determining the 
rights of employees." Id at 897 n.7l. The court analogized the situation involving union 
restraint to that involving employer restraint of employee distribution in the workplace. 
Id at 897. The Supreme Court, in Magnavox Co., held that the only time an employer 
may validly curb an employee's right to distribute in-plant literature is when the em­
ployer can show a legitimate business justification, such as interference with productivity 
or threat to safety. 415 U.S. at 326-27. The court in Hellon implied that since the union 
could not show any justifiable or legitimate reason for curbing Helton's distribution 
rights in a non-work area (the breakroom), there was no need to ascertain whether or not 
there were alternative means of communication available to him; the union had violated 
Helton's section 7 rights. 656 F.2d at 896-97. 
58. National Woodwork Mfg. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612,619 (1967). See infra 
notes 83-87 and accompanying text. 
59. See supra note 5. 
60. Id 
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8(b)(I)(A).61 The Board maintained that the union did not restrain 
or coerce Helton, but that its conduct was merely an interference.62 
Putting aside legislative history and looking only at the plain mean­
ing of the words of the statute, the court of appeals properly held 
that the union restrained Helton. This follows from the fact that 
both English and law dictionaries define the word "restrain" in 
broad terms.63 Neither limit the definition of the word to purely 
physical obstruction and, in fact, both mention a "moral force" as 
the equivalent of a restraint.64 
Interference by a union or employer may take the form of a 
direct or indirect act.6S Not only can interference be an act itself; it 
also follows as the result or consequence of an act.66 The union in­
terfered with Helton by prohibiting him from posting information on 
the union bulletin board. This direct interference resulted in the re­
straint of his freedom of expression in the workplace.67 One must 
look at the impact of an action by the union in the context of the 
relationship between the employee and the union.68 Dissenting 
61. 248 N.L.R.B. at 83. Section 8(a)(I) prohibits an employer from interfering 
with, restraining, or coercing an employee, whereas section 8(b)(I)(A) prohibits a union 
from restraining or coercing an employee. See supra note 5. 
62. 248 N.L.R.B. at 83. The Board neither cited case authority for this view nor 
gave any concrete examples of what they thought would constitute interference, restraint, 
or coercion. 
63. "Restrain" may be defined as, ''to hold [as a person) back from some action, 
procedure or course: prevent from doing something [as by physical or moral force or 
social pressure); ... to limit or restrict to or in respect to a particular action or course: 
keep within bounds or under control." N. WEBSTER, THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIC­
TIONARY 1936 (unabridged ed. 1961). Black's Law Dictionary defines "restrain" as 
to limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, 
destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion upon; to restrict; to hold or 
press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advanc­
ing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle; to repress or 
suppress; to curb. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1181 (5th ed. 1979) (citation omitted). 
64. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. Note that both authorities cite phys­
ical force as a prerequisite to coercion. 
65. 2 LAB. L. REp. (CCH) , 3701. 
66. Id 
67. 656 F.2d :t 896-97. See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text regarding 
the importance of an employee's right to distribute materials in the workplace. 
68. Some important considerations which should have been discussed by the 
Board are: (1) how were the union's acts cast?; (2) was a threat inferred?; (3) what did the 
union actor intend and what did the employee understand?; and (4) what was the in­
tended import of the message not to post materials? NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power 
Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). The Board's 
failure to take these ideas into consideration is interesting in view of the fact that the 
Supreme Court has previously held such considerations to be important to the Board's 
discussion of employer activity in other areas. See NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 
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Member Jenkins reasoned that he could conceive of no "greater re­
straint or coercive impact on section 7 rights than that which sup­
press[ed] freedom of expression in matters protected by and inherent 
in that section."69 Similar reasoning has been found in cases involv­
ing the term "restraint," particularly actions that limit first amend­
ment rights. These cases involved freedom of speech70 and 
expression,7l various labor cases discussing employees' rights to dis­
tribute organizational materials,72 or employees' discussions of self­
organization.73 The Board, in the instant case, reasoned that since 
there was no physical restraint or retribution, there was no restraint 
or coercion.74 But, as the court of appeals held, the Board's ruling 
ignored the varieties of miscellaneous union activity that involved 
neither physical restraint nor retribution, yet were found to violate 
section 8(b)(1)(A).75 These have included, inter alia, interference 
with employees' activities during working hours,76 surveillance by 
the union of employees at a rival union meeting,77 interference with 
employees' distribution of rival union literature,78 interference with 
314 U.s. 469, 477-79 (1941); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). In Gissel 
Packing Co. , the Court noted that the Board has a duty to focus on the question: "[w]hat 
did the speaker intend and the listener understand ...." Id. at 619. 
69. 248 N.L.R.B. at 84. Jenkins felt that both the absence of any implication of 
retribution, and the availability of alternative means of communication were irrelevant, 
"and a lack of a threat of reprisal does not legitimize the action." Id. 
70. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975) (re­
straint of first amendment freedoms by denying a promoter of theatrical productions the 
use of a municipal facility for the showing of a musical). 
71. See Joint School Dist. No.8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 
429 U.S. 167, 177 (1976) (restraining teacher's expressions on matters involving the oper­
ations of schools). 
72. See International Union of Auto. Workers (General Motors Corp.), 158 
N.L.R.B. 1723, 1724 (1966), enforcement denied, 65 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3103 (9th Cir. 
1967); International Union of Auto. Workers (General Motors Corp.), 147 N.L.R.B. 509, 
510 (1964), vacated, 345 F.2d 516 (6th Cir. 1965). 
73. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956). 
74. 248 N.L.R.B. at 83. See supra note 43. One might interpret the Board ruling as 
requiring that the employee and the union come to physical blows before a violation of 
section 7 can be found. This rationale does not comport with the NLRB's goal of pro­
moting industrial peace. See Brief for Petitioner at 18-20, Helton v. NLRB, 656 F.2d 883 
(D.C. Cir. 1981). 
75. 656 F.2d at 892; see infra notes 76-82; 2 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 3850. 
76. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbldg. Workers, Local 32 (Rawls Bros. Con­
tractors, Inc.), 133 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1961); In re Gimbel Bros., 100 N.L.R.B. 870 (1952). 
77. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Locals 698 and 298 (Skorman's Miracle Mart) 160 
N.L.R.B. 709 (1966). 
78. General Motors Corp., 158 N.L.R.B. 1723 (1966), enforcement denied, 65 
L.R.R.M. 3103 (BNA) (9th Cir. 1967); General Motors Corp., 147 N.L.R.B. 509 (1964), 
vacated, 345 F.2d 516 (6th Cir. 1965). 
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employees' meetings,79 blacklisting employees,80 execution of con­
tracts without evidence of majority representation,81 and union pre­
clusion of employee's unfettered option to allow or disallow a 
payroll deduction for dues.82 In these cases, the union, in some way, 
violated an employee's rights or prevented the employee from exer­
cising those rights. These violations were sufficient to support the 
finding of an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(I)(A). The 
Board, in Roadway Express, departed from its past practice by find­
ing no unfair labor practice although the union had restrained 
Helton in the exercise of his section 7 rights. It remains unclear as to 
how the Board will reconcile past decisions interpreting the Act and 
its goal of promoting industrial peace in light of its decision in Road­
way Express. 
B. Legislative History 
In Local 1976, United Brotherhood ofCarpenters and Joiners of- . ., 
America v. NLRB,83 the Supreme Court held that in construing a 
statute, the judicial function is limited to application of the Congres­
sional enactment.84 The Court, however, must first ascertain exactly 
what Congress had enacted and the purpose behind its enactment.85 
Most relevant to this inquiry is the language in which Congress has 
expressed its policy. 86 The Supreme Court has not confined the 
search into legislative history simply to administrative or court deci­
sions. The Court has held that while an agency's interpretation of a 
statute is entitled to some deference, courts retain an obligation to 
"honor the clear meaning of a statute, as revealed by its language, 
purpose and history."87 
79. Automobile Workers, Local 57 (International Harvester Co.), 102 N.L.R.B. 
III (1953). 
80. Pacific American Shipowners Ass'n, 98 N.L.R.B. 582 (1952); Teamsters, Local 
1040 (American Dr. Pepper Bottling Co.), 174 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1969). 
81. ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961). 
82. International Union of Elec. Workers, Local 601 (Westinghouse Elec. Corp.), 
180 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1970); see 656 F.2d at 892. 
83. 357 U.S. 93 (1958). 
84. Id at 100. 
85. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 179 (1967); National Wood­
work Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 619-20 (1967); NLRB v. Drivers Local 639, 362 
U.S. 274, 292 (1960). 
86. 357 U.S. at 100. See NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbldg. Work­
ers, 391 U.S. 418, 425 (1968) in which the Supreme Court approved of the Board'sjudg­
ment because it was consistent with the policy underlying the Act. Id 
87. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 
(1979); see Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1976). 
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The sponsors of the Taft-Hartley Act,88 in supporting section 
8(b)(I)(A) and other amendments to the original Wagner Act, fo­
cused primarily on the need to control union violence and economic 
coercion.89 The legislative history makes it clear that Congress in­
tended section 8(b)(I)(A) to cover as wide a range of conduct as that 
covered by section 8(a)(I).90 In explaining the amendment,91 Sena­
tor Ball, a cosponsor, stated that the purpose of section 8(b)(I)(A) 
was "to insert an unfair-labor practice [clause] for unions identical 
[to] the first unfair labor practice prohibited to employers in the pres­
ent act."92 Senator Taft explained that the proposal was that unions 
be bound in the same way under section 8(b)(l)(A) as employers 
were bound under section 8(a)(I).93 He later stated that an equal 
application of almost identical provisions was all that the sponsors 
intended to accomplish.94 In response to a request for a definition of 
88. See supra note 2. 
89. See 93 CONGo REC. 4435-36 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HIS­
TORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1205-06 (1948) (remarks 
of Sen. Taft) [hereinafter cited as NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY); 93 CONGo REC. 4016­
17 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 1018-21; 93 CONGo REC. 4432 
(1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 1199 (comments of Sen. Ball); see 
also 93 CONGo REc. 4434 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 1203 
(comments of Sen. Ball); S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1947), reprinted in I 
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 456 (1948) (supplemental views of Senators Taft, Ball, 
Donnell and Jenner on S. Res.1l26). But see NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. 175 
(1967) (Black, J., dissenting) in which Justice Black stated: 
But to say that § 8(b)(I)(A) covers only coercive organizational tactics, which 
the Court comes very close to doing, is to ignore much of the legislative history. 
It is clear that § 8(b)(1)(A) was intended to protect union as well as nonunion 
employees from coercive tactics of unions, and such protection would hardly be 
provided if the section applied only to organizational tactics. Also, it is clear 
that Congress was much more concerned with non-violent economic coercion 
than with threats of physical violence. 
Id at 211 (emphasis in original); see also Helton v. NLRB, 656 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
in which the court stated that "nothing in the legislative history supports the conclusion 
that violence and economic reprisal were the sole evils at which Section 8(b)(I)(A) was 
aimed." Id at 888-89. 
90. See S. REp. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 50-56 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 89, at 456 (supplemental views of Senators Taft, Ball, 
Donnell and Jenner); infra notes 92-97 and accompanying text. 
91. The Taft-Hartley Act amended the original Wagner Act. See supra note 2 and 
accompanying text. 
92. 93 CONGo REc. 4016 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 89, at 1018. . 
93. 93 CONGo REC. 4021 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 89, at 1025. 
94. 93 CONGo REc. 4436 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 89, at 1207. See S. REp. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1947), reprinted in I 
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 89, at 456; 93 CONGo REC. 4436 (1947), re­
printed in 2 NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 89, at 1206. 
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unfair labor practices that might be covered by this new provision, 
Senator Taft stated that "[i]f it be an unfair labor practice on the part 
of employers, why not on the part of a labor organization?"95 The 
Senator stated that the words "interfere with," "restrain," and "co­
erce" had been construed for so long by the NLRB in the case of 
employers that he thought it appropriate to use the same words in 
the comparable section regarding union actions.96 He further stated 
that this consistency in wording was necessary to ensure that the re­
strictions of union unfair labor practices would parallel those ap­
plied to employers.97 
Legislative history, however, can be deceiving when the word­
ing urged on the congressional floor is not put into the final statute. 
Consequently, one must look to the purpose behind the deletion of 
specific language from the statute. In Roadway Express, the Board 
urged that since the words "interfere with" were not found in section 
8(b)(I)(A) of the statute, Congress meant to establish a double stan­
dard for the conduct of employers and unions under the Act.98 
From a search of the legislative history regarding the omission of the 
words "interfere with," and as the court of appeals noted, an entirely 
different rationalization for the exclusion of those words emerges.99 
Section 8(b)(I)(A) came to the Senate floor with the words "interfere 
with" intact in the provision. 100 Senator Ives offered an amendment 
to eliminate the words "interfere with" from section 8(b)(I)(A) for 
fear of the construction that might very easily be placed on the words 
"interfere with." "They could easily be construed to mean that any 
conversation, and persuasion, any urging on the part of any person, 
in an effort to persuade another to join a labor organization, would 
95. 93 CONGo REc. 4023 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 89, at 1028; see 93 CONGo REC. 4025 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLA­
TNE HISTORY, at 1032 (Sen. Taft urged that what was being sought was merely to re­
quire that unions be subject to the same rules that govern employers). 
96. 93 CONGo REc. 4025-26 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 89, at 1032-33. 
97. 93 CONGo REC. 4025-26 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 89, at 1032-33. "If there are any such unfair labor practices [on the part of 
unions), then it is obvious that this is a most essential [restriction) to be included, a c1ear­
cut one, one which is most parallel to the unfair labor practice on the part of employers." 
Id 
98. 248 N.L.R.B. at 83. 
99. 656 F.2d at 889. "Omission of the words 'interfere with' from Section 
8(b)(I)(A) was not intended to indicate that union conduct should be measured against a 
less demanding standard than employer conduct." Id; see infra notes 100-04 and accom­
panying text. 
100. 93 CONGo REc. 4270 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 89, at 1138. 
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constitute an unfair labor practice. lOl After hearing Senator Ives' 
amendment, Senator Taft stated that he had consulted with his attor­
neys and that they informed him that elimination of the words "in­
terfere with" would not result in any substantial change of the 
meaning of the statute, nor have any effect on the Court decisions. 102 
Senator Ball agreed that the words "interfere with" were vague and 
noted the importance of eliminating vague language from the stat­
ute. 103 Senator Ball stated that the elimination of the words should 
not change the consequences of the statute since "in the correspond­
ing unfair labor practice for employers, no complaint is ever issued 
on the interference angle."I04 
It is apparent from the foregoing statements that Senators Ball 
and Taft envisioned the situation in Helton arising. In such a situa­
tion, a court's decision might tum on the explicit wording of the stat­
ute and on the inclusion of the words "interfere with" in section 
8(a)(I) and their reciprocal omission from section 8(b)(1)(A). The 
Senators were not concerned with leaving the words "interfere with" 
out of section 8(b)(I)(A) because it appeared to them that the Board 
never distinguished between interference and coercion or restraint in 
prior cases, and consequently there would be no need for the Board 
101. 93 CONGo REC. 4270-71 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 89, at 1138; see H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1947) ("[I)t is the 
purpose of the Committee to make entirely certain that Congress does not forbid repre­
sentatives, by reasonable means, to persuade employees to join the unions."); 93 CONGo 
REc. 4435 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 89, at 1205. 
Senator Smith stated that the words "interfere with" were eliminated 
because we were afraid they might imply that if a fellow member or an agent 
did something entirely legitimate, the words 'interfere with' might be construed 
as being sufficiently broad to prevent that happening. There is no intention 
whatever to prevent the legitimate building up of a union organization. The 
only intent is to prevent restraint or coercion by a labor organization or by 
employers, and we think the rules should be the same for one side as for the 
other. 
Id 
102. 93 CONGo REC. 4271 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 89, at 1138-39. 
103. 93 CONGo REC. 4271 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 89, at 1139. 
104. 	 See 2 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 3850. 
Absence of the term 'interference' in the statutory language designating the 
union unfair labor practice is of no great significance. Congressional explana­
tion states that the word 'interfere' was omitted so that unions and employers 
would be on equal footing. Employers were not held liable under the prior law 
[section 8(a)(I») where the conduct complained of constituted "interference," 
but not 'restraint' or 'coercion'. 
Id 
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to do so in the future. !Os While the Senators anticipated a factual 
situation similar to Helton, they did not envision a court making a 
distinction between the terms "coerce," "restrain," and "interfere." 
Omission of the words "interfere with" was not intended to reflect 
upon the degree of conduct to be exhibited by the union before a 
violation could be found. 
Evident from the legislative history surrounding the omission of 
the term "interfere with" from section 8(b)(I)(A) is the fact that there 
was no congressional presumption of a double standard for employ­
ers and unions regarding the unfair labor practice provisions at is­
sue. Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(b)(I)(A) were meant to parallel each 
other although differently worded. Accordingly, unions were to be 
held to the same standard of conduct as employers in unfair labor 
practice cases. 106 
While not articulated clearly by the Court nor discemable from 
the legislative history, another reason why Congress may have omit­
ted the term "interference" from section 8(b)(1)(A) was because de­
bate focused on the effects of the conduct between the union and the 
employer rather than on the conduct itself.107 Employer conduct is 
much more likely to restrain workers than union conduct because 
employers have economic control of the employee. Union conduct 
usually has to be more severe before employees will refrain from the 
exercise of their rights. lOS Nevertheless, in Helton, the union's ac­
tions had a limiting effect on the employee in that the actions of the 
job steward stopped Helton from exercise of his section 7 rightS. I09 
C. Supreme Court Decisions Interpreting Section 8(b)(J)(A) 
The court of appeals maintained that the Board, in Roadway 
Express, in arguing for a narrow interpretation of section 8(b)(1)(A), 
relied on two Supreme Court decisions,110 namely NLRB v. Drivers, 
105. See supra note 104. 
106. See supra notes 92-106 and accompanying text. 
107. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. 
108. There are certain situations where a union is held to a lesser standard of ac­
countability for its actions than is an employer. This is so especially when a union is first 
organizing and trying to achieve representation. An employer may be held to a higher 
standard because of the inequality of status and power between the union and the em­
ployer. However, once the union achieves an equality of bargaining power with the em­
ployer, the union should be held to the same standard as the employer. 
109. See 248 N.L.R.B. at 84 (Member Jenkins, dissenting). The union's conduct 
retrained Helton's conduct as it prohibited him from distributing union-related informa­
tion, a right guaranteed to him under section 7 of the Act, regardless of whether the 
material is pro-union or anti-union. Id; see supra note 47. 
110. 656 F.2d at 889-90. 
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Chauffeurs, Helpers, Union Local 639,111 and NLRB v. Allis-Chal­
mers Manufacturing CO.1I2 While these cases involved some inter­
pretation by the Supreme Court of section 8(b)(1)(A), both are 
distinguishable from Helton on their facts and on their legal hold­
ingS.1 \3 Accordingly, since neither case is analogous to the situation 
in Helton, neither can be properly cited as supporting authority for 
the Board's restrictive interpretation of section 8(b)(1 )(A). More­
over, in a strong dissent in Allis-Chalmers, Justice Black stated that 
legislative history should not be ignored, and that an application of 
section 8(b)(1)(A) should result in the finding of a violation. 114 Jus­
tice Black reviewed the legislative history and noted that the issue of 
an employee's relation to his employer, as contrasted with his rela­
tion to his union, arose in the congressional debates. On each occa­
sion, however, the sponsors of the Taft-Hartley amendment did not 
foresee any difference between the two relationships. I IS Thus, Justice 
Black concluded that the sponsors of section 8(b)(1)(A) intended it to 
parallel section 8(a)(I).116 
A major Supreme Court decision omitted from the Board's de­
cision, yet consistent with the court of appeals' construction of sec­
tion 8(b)(1)(A) in Helton, was International Ladies' Garment 
Workers' Union v. NLRB.117 In that case, the union was held to 
Ill. 362 u.s. 274 (1960). 
112. 388 u.s. 175 (1967). 
113. 656 F.2d at 889-90. The court of appeals in Helton distinguished both cases. 
The first case, Drivers Local 639, involved peaceful recognitional picketing by a labor 
union. The court distinguished Drivers Local 639 by reasoning that the Supreme Court 
did not explicitly state that section 8(b)(I)(A) was directed solely at union violence. 656 
F.2d at 889-90. Indeed, it was never determined that section 8(b)(l)(A) might not apply 
to union conduct lying somewhere between violence and simple peaceful persuasion. 
Therefore, the situation in the present case was not settled by Drivers Local 639. The 
second case distinguished by the court was Allis-Chalmers which involved a union fining 
its members for crossing a picket line. In that case the Supreme Court focused on the 
Board's authority to regulate internal union affairs under the proviso to section 
8(b)(l)(A). 388 U.S. at 191-95. The court of appeals distinguished Allis-Chalmers by 
finding that in that case the Supreme Court relied on the internal affairs proviso to sec­
tion 8(b)(I)(A) to take the fines out of a union violation, not on the lack of the word 
interference in the main body of the provision. 656 F.2d at 889-90. The internal affairs 
proviso of section 8(b)(l)(A) provides: "this paragraph [8(b)(I)(A)] shall not impair the 
right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or 
retention of membership therein." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(I)(A) (1976). 
114. 388 U.S. at 208 (Black, J., dissenting). He concluded: "I dissent because I am 
convinced that the Court has ignored the literal language of § 8(b)(I)(A) in order to give 
unions a power which the Court, but not Congress, thinks they need." Id at 217. 
115. Id at 209-11; see 93 CONGo RIle. 4022 (1947). 
116. 388 U.S. at 209 (Black, J., dissenting). 
117. 366 U.S. 731 (1961). 
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have violated section 8(b)(l)(A) by its acceptance of exclusive bar­
gaining authority when it actually held only minority representation 
status. I IS The lower court held "that the provisions were intended to 
be parallel is indicated by the similarity of the language employed 
and is confirmed by the legislative history of the provisions." 119 The 
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision and added: "In the 
Taft-Hartley law, Congress added [section] 8(b)(I)(A) to the Wagner 
Act, prohibiting, as the Court of Appeals held, 'unions from invad­
ing the rights of employees under [section] 7 in a fashion comparable 
to the activities of employers prohibited under [section] 8(a)(I).' "120 
The Supreme Court also noted that "[i]t was the intent of Congress 
to impose upon unions the same restrictions which the Wagner Act 
imposed upon employers with respect to violations of employee 
rightS."121 
D. Access to Bulletin Boards 
The place of work historically has been held to be a place 
uniquely appropriate for the dissemination of views regarding the 
bargaining representative. 122 In a long line of decisions, the Board 
has taken the position that the promulgation and enforcement of 
rules restricting distribution of literature are not valid, particularly 
when applied to activities carried on in opposition to the incumbent 
union.123 In fact, general rules prohibiting distribution of literature 
118. Id at 937-38. 
119. ILGWU v. NLRB, 280 F.2d 616, 620-21 (D.C. Cir. 1960), qfid, 366 U.S. 731 
. (1961). 
120. 366 U.S. at 738. 
121. Id 
122. 415 U.S. at 325; see Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978); NLRB v. Mid­
States Metal Prods., Inc., 403 F.2d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1968); Gale Prods., 142 N.L.R.B. 
1246, 1249 (1963), enforcement denied, 337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1964). It has been further 
explained that 
[t]heir place of work is the one location where employees are brought together 
on a daily basis. It is the one place where they clearly share common interests 
and where they traditionally seek to persuade fellow workers in matters affect­
ing their union organizational life and other matters related to their status as 
employees. This is undeniably so in the case ofemployee dissatisfaction involv­
ing efforts to change their bargaining representative. 
Id 
123. See NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Prods. Inc., 403 F.2d 702, 706 (5th Cir. 1968). 
"Solicitation and distribution of literature on plant premises are important elements in 
giving full play to the right of employees to seek displacement of an incumbent union." 
Id at 705; see also Transcon Lines, 235 N.L.R.B. 1163 (1978), enforced, 599 F.2d 719 
(5th Cir. 1979); International Union of Auto. Workers (General Motors Corp.), 158 
N.L.R.B. 1723 (1966), enforcement denied, 65 L.R.R.M. 3103 (DNA) (9th Cir. 1967); In­
ternational Union of Auto. Workers (General Motors Corp.), 147 N.L.R.B. 509 (1964), 
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in the workplace have been held to be presumptively invalid. 124 
Employee access to bulletin boards in the workplace is an issue 
that has arisen repeatedly,125 Nevertheless, . the issue has only been 
addressed by the Board with regard to employer restrictions upon 
employee access, not with regard to union restrictions on employees, 
The Board in Roadway Express reasoned that since the cases it had 
decided regarding access to bulletin boards involved the application 
of section 8(a)(1) and not section 8(b)(1)(A), the rulings in those 
cases were not controlling in a case where an alleged union violation 
occurred,126 The Board failed to address the legislative history of the 
statute when applying it in Roadway Express ,127 
Since the proper interpretation of section 8(b)(1)(A) in this cir­
cumstance is analagous to section 8(a)(1),128 it is relevant to review 
the Board's decisions in bulletin board cases.129 The leading case in 
the area of discriminatory application of employee access to bulletin 
boards is Vincent's Steak House ,130 There, the Board found that the 
employer violated section 8(a)(1) by discriminatorily enforcing rules 
regarding permission to post materials on the bulletin board.l3l Nu-
vacated, 345 F.2d 516 (6th Cir. 1965); Armco Steel Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1964), 
reversed, 344 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1965); Gale Prods., Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 1246, 1249 (1963), 
enforcement denied, 337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1964); Nu-Car Carriers, Inc., 88 N.L.R.B. 75 
(1950), enforced, 189 F.2d 756 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1951). The 
Board in Nu-Car Carriers discussed the purpose of the Act as not foreclosing employees 
from questioning the wisdom of their representation or trying to align their union with 
their position. Id. at 76. 
124. See Magnavox, 415 U.S. at 326; Armco Steel Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 1179, 1185 
(1964), reversed, 344 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1965); Gale Prods., Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 1246, 1248 
(1963), enforcement denied, 337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1964); setr also Republic Aviation 
Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). 
125. See infra notes 134-50 and accompanying text. 
126. 248 N.L.R.B. at 83. 
127. It is curious that an administrative agency charged with the duty of interpret­
ing and applying a statute would not look at the legislative history surrounding the stat­
ute when applying the law to a new situation. 
128. See supra notes 87-103 and accompanying text for a discussion of the applica­
ble legislative history. 
129. Although the administrative law judge felt that this analysis was proper to 
make, neither dissenting Member Jenkins nor the court of appeals gave this analysis full 
consideration. 
130. 216 N.L.R.B. 647 (1975). 
131. Id. at 647-48. In the Board's view, the entire course of conduct by the em­
ployer with regard to removing an offensive newspaper article from the bulletin board 
"made crystal clear to Respondent's employees that such a method of communicating 
information to fellow workers concerning matters relating to their 'mutual aid or protec­
tion' would not be permitted in ~e future." Id. Thus, the employer "disparately denied 
employees' access to its bulletin boards for their concerted activities in violation of Sec­
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act." Id. 
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merous cases decided by the Board follow the line of reasoning in 
Vincent's,132 and many did not involve the use of threats or disci­
pline by the employer. 133 
In Green Giant Co. ,134 the Board found a violation of section 
8(a)(1) in the discriminatory denial of the use of a farmshop bulletin 
board for the posting of pro-union literature. 135 In two cases involv­
ing the General Motors Corporation,136 an employee filed an unfair 
labor practice charge against both the employer and the union for 
maintaining a collective bargaining agreement that contained a pro­
vision that restricted the right of employees to distribute union litera­
ture on the employer's bulletin board. In both cases, the Board 
found a violation. 137 The Board held that "neither an employer nor 
an incumbent union is entitled to attempt to freeze out another 
union by waiving the employee's right to urge a change in their col­
lective-bargaining representative."138 In Roadway Express, the em­
ployee was merely criticizing the actions of officers and leaders of the 
Teamster's International Union and was not attempting to persuade 
employees to change their bargaining representative. 139 
In Nugent Service, Inc., 140 the Board held that an employer 
could prevent the posting of partisan campaign material. 141 The 
Board, however, noted that 
an employer who permits official union notices and communica­
tions to its members to be posted on its bulletin boards may not 
132. See infra notes 134-50 and accompanying text. 
133. See infra notes 140-50 and accompanying text. 
134. 223 N.L.R.B. 377 (1976). 
135. Id at 379. 
136. International Union of Auto. Workers (General Motors Corp.), 158 N.L.R.B. 
1723 (1966), enforcement denied, 65 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3103 (9th Cir. 1967); International 
Union of Auto. Workers (General Motors Corp.), 147 N.L.R.B. 509 (1964), vacated, 345 
F.2d 516 (6th Cir. 1965). 
137. International Union of Auto. Workers (General Motors Corp.), 158 N.L.R.B. 
1723, 1723-24 (1966), enforcement denied, 65 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3103 (9th Cir. 1967); Inter­
national Union of Auto. Workers (General Motors Corp.), 147 N.L.R.B. 509, 510 (1964), 
vacated, 345 F.2d 516 (6th Cir. 1965). 
138. International Union of Auto. Workers (General Motors Corp.), 158 N.L.R.B. 
1723, 1726 (1966), enforcement denied, 65 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3103 (9th Cir. 1967). The 
Board continued, emphasizing that "the Act commands us to protect the employees' stat­
utory right at appropriate times to review and reconsider their former selection of a 
union as a collective-bargaining representative, either by replacing it with another union 
or by completely abandoning collective bargaining." Id (emphasis in original). 
139. 248 N.L.R.B. at 85. There, the articles and editorials were not directed to­
wards local officers or agents. Id 
140. 207 N.L.R.B. 158 (1973). 
141. Id at 161. 
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thereafter discriminate against an employee who posts a union no­
tice which meets the employer's rule or standard but which the 
employer finds distasteful; while an employer whose practice it 
has been to permit employees to post on its bulletin boards notices 
of various types unrelated to their employment but who remove 
only notices of union meetings violates section 8(a)(I) thereby.142 
This second situation is analagous to Roadway Express and therefore 
should be controlling. 
In Container Corp. ofAmerica,143 the Board found a violation of 
section 8(a)(l) despite the fact that the employer believed that the 
material posted was "absolutely insulting and inflammatory" and in 
violation of the provision in the collective bargaining agreement. l44 
The Board admitted that there was no statutory right for employees 
or a union to use an employer's bulletin board. 145 The Board went 
on to state, however, that 
once an employer extends to a union the right to use the bulletin 
board, either verbally or by practice, or contractually, the union's 
right to use of the board takes on the protection of the Act to the 
extent that the employer may not thereafter bar the union from 
posting notices where it allows indiscriminate employee use of its 
bulletin boards for posting matters of general concern unrelated to 
union activity.l46 
Applying this standard to Helton, once the union, by practice, 
allowed employees to post non-union business on the bulletin board, 
it thereafter could not bar employees from posting other notices, in­
cluding notices the union found critical of it or otherwise "distaste­
ful."147 In a similar manner, the Board decided Challenge Cook 
Brothers of Ohio, Inc., 148 which was enforced by the Court of Ap­
peals for the Sixth Circuit. In Challenge Cook Brothers, the em­
142. Id (footnote omitted). 
143. 244 N .L.R.B. 318 (1979), enforced in part, enforcement denied in part, 649 F .2d 
1213 (6th Cir. 1981). 
144. Id at 319. The Board held that the test for determining whether material 
loses its statutory protection because of derogatory language was set out in Timpte, Inc., 
233 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1977), enforcement denied, 590 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1979). The test is 
"whether the language is 'offensive, defamatory, or opp[or]orious [sic] and not simply 
intemperate, utlammatory, or insulting.''' 244 N.L.R.B. at 320. Note that in Roadway 
Express, the union's argument that they removed the material because it was derogatory, 
adverse toward the union, and controversial among the members did not withstand judi­
cial scrutiny. See 656 F.2d at 885. 
145. 244 N.L.R.B. at 318 n.2. 
146. Id at 321 (citations omitted). 
147. See 244 N.L.R.B. at 318 n.2. 
148. 153 N.L.R.B. 92 enforced, 374 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1965). 
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ployer had permitted employees to post various materials on the 
company bulletin board but removed notices of union meetings. 149 
The Board held that this discriminatory removal of materials, al­
though unaccompanied by any threats or discipline by the employer, 
constituted a violation of section 8(a)(l).lso Again, the situation is 
analagous to Helton. 
Helton is similar to the situations in previous bulletin board 
cases decided by the Board, with the only outstanding difference be­
ing that this case involved union conduct rather than employer con­
duct, thereby constituting a section 8(b)(I)(A) violation rather than a 
section 8(a)(I) violation. lSI The background of Board decisions ls2 
and the relevant legislative history confirming the use of the same 
standard under both sectionslS3 provided the court of appeals with 
solid ground to simply apply the prior case law to Helton. If an em­
ployer violates an employee's section 7 rights in regard to access to a 
bulletin board, a similar finding of an unfair labor practice is war­
ranted if the union attempts to restrain access in a comparable 
manner. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is evident from the legislative history that section 8(b)(I)(A) 
was meant to be the analogue to section 8(a)(I), although the specific 
language of the two sections varies. IS4 Although the legislative his­
tory is compelling in this case, the court of appeals was the only fo­
rum that addressed the legislative history at all. It is peculiar that 
the Board, an agency delegated with the duty to interpret the statute, 
did not consider the legislative history. Assuming, arguendo, that 
the legislative history is irrelevant, the union's conduct at issue here 
would still be covered by the explicit words of section 8(b)(I)(A). In 
Helton, the actions of the union did not constitute mere interference, 
149. Id at 94-95. 
150. Id at 99. For other recent Board decisions involving similar facts and find­
ings see Stanley Furniture Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 589 (1979); North Kingston Nursing Care 
Center, 244 N.L.R.B. 54 (1979); Liberty Nursing Homes, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 456 (1978); 
George Washington Univ. Hosp., 227 N.L.R.B. 1362 (1977); Beryl Chevrolet, Inc., 199 
N.L.R.B. 120 (1972); see Mid-West Stock Exch. v. NLRB 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3172 (7th 
Cir. 1980), in which the court of appeals approved the Board's ruling that the company's 
unequal treatment and discriminatory enforcement of its no solicitation rule violated 
8(a)(I). Id at 3184. 
151. See supra notes 140-50 and accompanying text. 
152. Id 
153. See supra notes 89-104 and accompanying text. 
154. Id 
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but acted as a restraint. When such acts rise to the level of restraint, 
they constitute unfair labor practices. The Board also erred in its 
analysis by establishing a double standard under the Act for unions 
and employers. Since an employer, under the same conditions as in 
Helton, would violate the Act, a union similarly should be found to 
violate the Act when it restrains an employee's exercise of his section 
7 rights. 
The impression gleaned from the Board's decision is that the 
Board attempted to control dissent within the union. One wonders 
how far the Board would allow a union to go in curbing employees' 
rights before it would put a halt to union restraint. A narrow read­
ing of section 8(b)(1)(A), which only curbs union action when it 
meets the strict standard that the Board has employed here, under­
cuts the Act and defeats its policies and purposes. 
Although most Board decisions are reviewable by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,155 it remains 
unknown whether the Board will adopt and enforce the ruling in 
Helton .156 The Board should remember that the Labor-Manage­
ment Relations Act was written primarily for the benefit of employ­
ees, not for the benefit of unions or employers. 157 Future Board 
decisions should reflect the intent of the legislature to hold employ­
ers and unions to an equal standard for violations under either sec­
tion 8(a)(1) or section 8(b)(1)(A). 
Eileen S. Baird 
155. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(t) (1976). 
156. The Board could stonewall, or the General Counsel could refuse to even issue 
a complaint against the union for these types of violations. 
157. NLRB v. Schwartz, 146 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1945). The court stated that 
[c]ontrary to a rather general misconception, the National Labor Relations 
Act was passed for the primary benefit of the employees as distinguished from 
the primary benefit to labor unions, and the prohibition of unfair labor prac­
tices designed by an employer to prevent the free exercise by employees of their 
wishes in reference to becoming members of a union was intended by Congress 
as a grant of rights to the employees rather than as a grant of power to the 
union. 
Id at 774 (emphasis in original); accord NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Prods. Inc., 403 F.2d 
702, 704 (5th Cir. 1968). 
